How (not) to be a Great Philosopher

In his impressive volume Malachi Haim Hacohen undertook to tell the story of the first half of Karl Popper’s long life. (He proclaims that there will be no sequel dealing with the remaining nearly fifty years of his life, which he thinks to be better known and, apparently, of lesser interest). Hacohen’s narrative is also a very good story of the first half of the past century’s intellectual and political upheavals. Hacohen describes in detail in what sense Popper was a victim of the turmoils, how he reacted to them, and to what extent, later on, he informed them, both in the world of ideas and of politics. This well written and extremely well researched Popper’s biography is in particular a comprehensive account of the socio-political Viennese context in which Popper formulated his fundamental ideas about science and society. For this reason Hacohen’s book could well be entitled Popper’s Vienna and will successfully compete with the Janik and Toulmin’s shorter Wittgenstein’s Vienna, devoted to the same period of this unique city at the turn of the 19th century.

The secret of Hacohen’s success is that he very aptly negotiates between his evident enchantment with Popper and his philosophy (Hacohen thinks he was a genius) and well documented fact that he had to cope with a very recalcitrant and not always likable subject. Popper was notorious for his difficult character (one is surprised that this has shown itself prominently so early in Popper’s career!). The difficulty for a Popper’s biographer lies, however, not in the intricacies of Popper’s temper (they are rather easy to decipher), nor in the complexity of the intellectual work (which is famed for its exceptional clarity, if not simplicity – no mean feat for someone for whom the English language was the second one, learned in mature age at that), but in the fact that Popper’s autobiography (and numerous fragments which did not make into the published Unended Quest) and his later views of his earlier work are, to put it mildly, rational (or irrational) reconstructions of intellectual development which was very different from the one Popper wished to be known. For Popper not only dehistoricised but also depsychologised his development (something only to be expected from the leading antihistoricist and antipsychologist). This made Hacohen’s task quite formidable. But his extensive knowledge of the Popper’s archives, his deep understanding of contemporary philosophy, together with excellent narrative skills, make for quite fascinating and pleasurable reading.

Much used Isaiah Berlin’s (and Archilochus’s) distinction between hedgehog and the fox in its application to thinkers works well in Popper’s case too. Popper wished us to view him as a monolith of cosmopolitan, liberal and individualist morals, and of critical rationalist convictions from his very philosophical childhood. But, as Hacohen shows, he was, at least initially, a groping and confused aspirer, led in different directions by rather extreme and powerful ambitions, helping himself generously on the way to other people’s ideas (without bothering much about acknowledgement), eventually composing powerful system of ideas known as Critical Rationalism, which he spent his remaining half of life on defending from the attacks from foes and friends alike.

Hacohen muses as to why Popper’s original ideas, most important of which seems to be his nonfoundationalism, anti-positivism, and the idea of contingency of knowledge, have been neglected now, in the advent of the deconstructionist and poststructuralist haute couture. After all, the current fashion is not much dissimilar in content from Popper’s ideas formed in 30-ties of the past century; they now pass, however, for plain prêt-à-porter at most. He also regrets that Popper did not form a coalition with e.g. now fashionable Jürgen Habermas, despite essential closeness of their views on politics and society. This provokes a question, not put by Hacohen, as to why some people’s ideas catch on immediately and stay with us, why others’ ones have to wait for recognition, and why others’ still grow obsolete prematurely. Russell (much admired by Popper) said that rationalist is distinguished not so much by the contents of the ideas s/he holds but by the way s/he holds them. In principle, in the present nonfoundationalist age, it is difficult not to subscribe to some ideas Popper had put forward as first. The issue is why few people now use Popper as an inspiration. This would demand to show in historical and psychological detail why Popper’s ideas, once (theoretically and performatively) quite powerful in the times of positivism and the cold war (even if misunderstood), do not enjoy nowadays the respect Hacohen thinks they deserve. Hacohen demonstrates that Popper’s main philosophical contentions were initially too revolutionary to be fully appreciated. On the other hand, presently, they are perceived as too outdated and conservative to find wider following. One of the answers seems to be that Popper, though he lived long enough to see the birth of postmodernism, in his later work did little to demonstrate validity and pertinence of his thought, living largely of the rent of his past achievements. And if he did, he had done something wrong. Was it only because the spirit of time had wandered the other way? It is certainly quite clear that few people expected of the old Popper to say something wholly unexpected. This enables to draw a risky (since antagonising) comparison: if Wittgenstein was a mystic hedgehog who forced himself to be a (reluctant) fox, Popper was a confused fox who grew later into a conservative and predictable hedgehog.

There are some grievances one could hold against author. In one of the most interesting fragments of the book Hacohen discusses critically Popper’s stunning, indeed shocking “solution” of the Jewish problem which Sir Karl thought the Jews should apply themselves (namely by complete renunciation of their Jewish identity). At the same time Hacohen (himself a Jew) interprets him in his wanderings as le Juif errant, thus doing a bit too much of Popper’s Jewishness, profusely rejected, denied and suppressed by the doctrinally anti-ethnocentric Popper. Also, despite evident love for Popper, Hacohen does not attempt to hide his multiple failures; this makes for the truth of the book and due to this Popper’s portrait gains a lot by becoming more human (if not always humane), all his scholarly and personal vices and virtues evenly interwoven. Unfortunately, in some places he skips quotations (especially from voluminous Popper’s correspondence) which would drive his critical points home more vividly; such authorial policy is somewhat against the fine art of critical philosophical biography, whose standards were recently set very highly by Ray Monk’s works. Another problem which (occasionally) bothers reader is that in drawing expansive picture of the context of Popper’s work, Hacohen betrays some lacunas in his otherwise impressive historical knowledge (one example: Protagoras did not “end up in exile” for, expelled from “tolerant” Athens, he actually never got anywhere, having previously perished in the depths of the seas due to a storm.) Also, in parts where Hacohen betrays his partisanship and attempts to defend Popper from justified and unjustified criticisms, his narrative becomes somewhat wooden. These are, though, minor failings, and Hacohen’s book is much to be recommended to the widest philosophical public. For in its honest scholarship and balanced criticism, it is tremendously instructive as to how to be and, in equal measure, how not to be a (great) philosopher.

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* The review has been published in The Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, No 1, January-March 2002, pp. 114-115.