Hume the Pyrrhonian
The topic of the book by Zuzana Parusniková is David Hume’s way of dealing with the challenge of
scepticism as it emerged in the post-Cartesian philosophy[1].
According to one of the main claims expounded in the book, Hume was the only
philosopher of the Enlightenment who took up the challenge of the radical
Cartesian scepticism and the resulting phenomenalism with full awareness of
possible consequences of this step and without any recourse of the recently
repudiated metaphysics[2].
Parusniková’s approach to Hume’s epistemology is structured around three
pillars, i.e. the Cartesian, the empiricist, and the Pyrrhonian. Accordingly,
the narrative of the book is constructed around these three axes.
The argument of the book begins with
an extensive account of the emergence of the idea of the autonomous rational
mind, which, having gotten rid of the constraints of the theological and
metaphysical cognitive regime, has been presented by Descartes as capable of
grasping, unaided, the certainly true knowledge. As is well known, in the
Cartesian approach, scepticism does play an important role, but only as a way
to clear the obstacles for the mind to get hold of its indubitable awareness of
its own thinking which then becomes a starting point of the reasoning aiming to
reconstitute the knowledge of the world upon a novel foundation. Parusniková
argues that the Cartesian belief in the autonomy of the mind has been the
cornerstone of Hume’s epistemology.
The captivating Cartesian argument
has led to a number of important criticisms, most significant of them
instigated by Mersenne. At the same time, however, more notably, it soon opened
a ground for alternative philosophical approaches. One of them, the empiricist
one, has been directed against the Cartesian nativism, i.e. his view that the
mind is possessed of some innate certain knowledge. Empiricism has found
perhaps its most refined expression in the philosophy of John Locke. According
to Parusniková, Hume is an empiricist too, yet a critical one: adopting the
empiricist claims that it is the sensations that constitute the matter of our
knowledge, he cogently and persuasively stressed that knowledge contains also
universal statements and principles which cannot be derived from sensations.
The third, perhaps the most
important attitude that characterises Hume’s philosophy also emerged as a
result of the Cartesian philosophical intervention. It was the radical
scepticism which grew owing to the Enlightenment’s revival of the ancient Greek
and Roman scepticism, the most extreme of them being the Pyrrhonian doctrine. Parusniková
demonstrated the extent to which Pyrrhon’s radically sceptical ideas influenced
Hume and how they determined the course of his intellectual development. In
particular, she has shown how his “grand project of science of man” (p. xiii)
emerged following the lesson he learned from the sceptical criticism of the
human rational abilities.
It is worth remarking here upon the
continuing relevance of Hume’s sceptical approach in the theory of knowledge.
Hume’s critical empiricism and sceptical attitude, in particular in his
criticism of inductivism and justificationism, was of paramount importance both
for the philosopher of the Vienna Circle, and for Karl Popper as its “official
opposition”. The significance of Hume’s sceptical philosophy for Popper is
evidenced most especially in the first chapter of Popper’s Objective Knowledge in which Popper formulated a comprehensive
criticism of the so-called problem of induction in its three embodiments: the
logical, pragmatic, and psychological ones. Popper’s critique of induction has
played the crucial role in his repudiation of the positivist epistemology of
the logical empiricism promulgated by the Vienna Circle. There are important
differences between them, though. Hume, having undermined the principle of
induction, conceded that human mind works as if some universal statements and
principles were valid even though it has no grounds for assuming their
validity. In his own hypothetical-deductive approach Popper adopts Hume’s
criticism of induction, yet rejects his pragmatist and psychological attitude
by arguing that Hume, having rationally demolished induction, acquiesced in an
irrational belief that induction may be pragmatically and psychologically
valid. In so doing, however, Popper seems to have failed to grasp the true
Humean message which had to do with his original attempt to describe the
workings of human mind, especially its yearning for a firm ground in knowledge,
despite the logically valid sceptical arguments against the possibility of such
knowledge.
In my opinion Parusniková’s book is
a document of sophisticated and refined scholarship, close reading of the
subject matter, and imaginative interpretation of the ideas she discusses. One
of many virtues of her scholarship is that she precisely delineated the scope
of her investigations, clearly formulated her theses, and executed her tasks by
developing persuasive and well-grounded arguments. In her argumentation she
demonstrated an extensive, indeed impressive knowledge of Hume’ work and a wide
range of other doctrines and authors. Her narrative is supported by multiple
relevant references to many philosophical doctrines. This is a very strong
testimony of her comprehensive acquaintance with the history of philosophy as
such. Her wide historical knowledge has been aptly demonstrated in particular
in her account of the debates that followed publication of Descartes’s books.
Her references to Aristotle’s conception of the soul, in the context of the
Cartesian and Hume’s conceptions are illuminative, so is her account of the
revival of scepticism thanks to Montaigne’s popular essays, and her other
references to the sceptical tradition. This extensive historical backing makes
for a very good reading of her works.
Moreover, her book is an excellent
interpretative guide not only through the work of Hume itself, but also through
an imposing volume of the Humean scholarship. This is a very important issue
since Hume is one of the most widely discussed philosophers of the
Enlightenment and the number of publications devoted to his oeuvre is daunting. Parusniková’s
extensive knowledge enables her to discern a number of interesting dilemmas and
oppositions which she formulates in an elegant way. In relation to the role of
scepticism in the post-Cartesian philosophy she remarked on the double-edged
nature of scepticism: on the one hand, it has a liberating effect on the
philosophical thinking, since it freed the reason from the metaphysical and
religious constraints, but at the same time, its effect has also been
paralysing, since it did prevent the reason to assert anything with certainty
(p. 55). Another paradox pertinently expressed by Parusniková has to do with
the Hume’s rejection of the radical disturbing Pyrrhonism in epistemology only
to be able to embrace the moral Pyrrhonian injunction to strive towards tranquillity
through addressing the issues of practical life to which the paralysing doubts
do not apply (p. 87; my formulation).
Having said that, I would like to
raise several critical, though minor points. One of them has to do with the
fact that Parusniková, in her dealing with Hume, did not refer more extensively
to the interpretive work of Annette Baier, undoubtedly one of the greatest
contemporary Hume scholars. Despite the importance of Baier’s work to
understanding Hume, her work has been referred to by Parusniková just once. I
am mentioning Baier’s contribution to the Hume’s scholarship in order to draw
attention to a certain lacuna in Parusniková’s work. She repeatedly argues that
Hume, having undermined the possibility of any firm theory of knowledge,
devoted his attention to social, historical and political matters, praising,
after a Pyrrhonian fashion, private pleasure, gentle manners and moderation.
The proper attitude for consideration of these topics was for him, as she
claims, the “mitigated scepticism”. Parusniková
stresses that Hume was in fact anxious to leave the problems of the sceptical
scrutiny of the foundations of knowledge and to steer the attention to the
areas in which we can philosophise in a positive, productive manner – to
emotions, religion, politics, justice, economics and history[3].
Even though Parusniková explores at length the meaning of the Hume’s mitigated
scepticism, which forms the very foundation of Hume’s mature attitude to
philosophy’s tasks, she leaves the discussion of the contents of Hume’s ideas related to the “moral sciences and common
life”[4]
outside the scope of her narrative. It is quite understandable that in a book
of a limited space, with a well-defined theme of scepticism in epistemology,
the seminal Hume’s contributions to moral, political economic or aesthetic
matters had to be left outside the scope of her explorations. Despite that I
think that a picture of Hume’s philosophy in her book would be fuller if these
issues were addressed at a slightly greater length than it is the case in Parusniková’s
book. In particular, I believe that Hume’s work in moral theory is much worthy
of discussion, especially his understanding of the moral rules. His approach to
this issue continues to inspire those who wish to avoid the uncompromising
Kantian universalism and the reckless opportunism.
Another issue which leaves the
reader slightly puzzled is Parusniková’s remark on Richard Popkin’s analysis of
Hume’s “mitigated scepticism”[5]
in which she claims that Hume’s understanding of mitigated scepticism “goes way
beyond” Popkin’s analysis. She summarises Popkin’s position by saying that
according to him the mitigated scepticism should be understood as a sceptical
attitude which has relevance to epistemology, and should not be seen as a tamed
or “domesticated” scepticism. The idea of mitigation thus refers not to blunting the edge of scepticism, but to limiting
its range. It means, in other words, a separation of the space of
theoretical considerations to which sceptical arguments apply, from the natural
attitude which is immune from the sceptical doubt. Such an approach introduces
an insuperable rupture in the Enlightenment’s ideal of knowledge. In other
words, Hume’s adoption of the mitigated scepticism has undermined the
Enlightenment’s ambitions to provide a firm foundation for a coherent and
unified system of all knowledge. Hume’s separation between reason and instinct,
together with his criticism of reason, is tantamount to acquiescence in the
fact that such an edifice of unified knowledge cannot be built.
Now, what is not quite clear is how Parusniková’s
interpretation of Hume’s mitigated scepticism differs from Popkins’. Parusniková
consistently claims, just like Popkin, that for Pyrrho’s lesson is to remain
valid for Hume in the matters of the theory of knowledge, but is to be
suspended in the area of life and morality. This is the essence of Hume’s
correction to the “disease” of the unwavering and comprehensive Pyrrhonism[6]
which becomes performatively inconsistent due to its very attempt to remain
consistent. She also claims that Hume broke the link between aporia and epechein, i.e. perplexity and suspension of judgement (p. 84). But,
as remarked above, this argumentation seems very much in line with Popkin’s
argument. In order to underline the difference between her approach and
Popkin’s, Parusniková only mentions that Popkin “underestimates”[7]
the domains in which the mitigated scepticism is operative within Hume’s work.
This criticism, however, is not buttressed by any references in support of her
critical charge. More importantly, in view of the above-mentioned fact that her
own account of Hume’s philosophy largely leaves out from the discussion his
contribution to moral, politics, aesthetics, etc., the charge she levels
against Popkin seems to apply to her in much the same measure.
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